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Abstract
This paper provides a competitive equilibrium model of capital structure and industry dy-
namics. In the model, ¯rms make ¯nancing, investment, entry, and exit decisions subject to
idiosyncratic technology shocks. The capital structure choice re°ects the tradeo® between
the tax bene¯ts of debt and the associated bankruptcy and agency costs. The interaction be-
tween ¯nancing and production decisions in°uences the stationary distribution of ¯rms and
their survival probabilities. The analysis demonstrates that the equilibrium output price
has an important feedback e®ect. This e®ect has a number of testable implications. For
example, high growth industries have relatively lower leverage and turnover rates.
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considerable attention in both economics and ¯nance. Beginning with Brander and Lewis (1986,
1988) and Maksimovic (1988), a growing number of theoretical papers investigate this interac-
tion. In addition, many empirical studies (Chevalier (1995a, 1995b), Phillips (1995), Kovenock
and Phillips (1997), Maksimovic and Phillips (1998), Zingales (1998), Lang, Ofek, and Stulz
(1996), Mackay and Phillips (2004)) examine the relation between capital structure and ¯rm
entry, exit, investment and output decisions.1 These studies generally document the following:
² Industry output is negatively associated with the average industry debt ratio.
² Plant closings are positively associated with debt and negatively associated with plant-level
productivity.
² Firm entry is positively associated with debt of incumbents.
² Firm investment is negatively associated with debt.
² There is substantial inter- and intra-industry variation in leverage.
It is well known that debt causes the underinvestment and asset substitution problems iden-
ti¯ed by Myers (1977) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). However, it is important to emphasize
that simply taking leverage as an exogenous regressor may be misleading. This is because ra-
tional ¯rms may anticipate the e®ect of leverage on product/input market behavior so that the
latter may in°uence capital structure choices. This endogeneity problem makes the interpreta-
tion of the above empirical evidence controversial. As pointed out by Zingales (1998, p.905),
\in the absence of a structural model we cannot determine whether it is the product market
competition that a®ects capital structure choices or a ¯rm's capital structure that a®ects its
competitive position and its survival."
The main contribution of my paper is to ¯ll this theoretical gap by providing an industry
equilibrium model in which capital structure choices and production decisions are simultaneously
in°uenced by the same exogenous factors. The second contribution of my paper is related to
industrial organization. Many empirical studies in industrial organization have documented
cross-industry di®erences in ¯rm turnover. However, little theoretical research has been devoted
to understanding the impact of ¯nancing policies on ¯rm turnover.2 The present paper adds to
this literature both by showing how the interaction between ¯nancing and production decisions
in°uences ¯rm turnover and by providing new testable predictions regarding its determinants.
The basic structure of the model is as follows. The model features a continuum of ¯rms facing
idiosyncratic technology shocks. These ¯rms are controlled by shareholders and make ¯nancing,
entry, exit, and production decisions. The capital structure choice is modelled by incorporating
approaches of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), and Jensen
1and Meckling (1976).3 Moreover, this choice re°ects the equilibrium interaction between ¯-
nancing and production/investment decisions. Speci¯cally, production/investment decisions are
chosen to maximize equity value after debt is in place so that shareholder-bondholder con°icts
lead to agency costs as in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977).4 The initial cap-
ital structure choice, made ex ante, trades o® the tax bene¯ts of debt versus the associated
bankruptcy and agency costs. Thus, the model departs from the standard Modigliani-Miller
framework.
In a long-run stationary industry equilibrium, there is a stationary distribution of surviving
¯rms. These ¯rms exhibit a wide variation of leverage. Furthermore, all industry-wide equilib-
rium variables are constant over time, although individual ¯rms are continually adjusting, with
some of them expanding, others contracting, some starting up, and others closing down.
I derive a closed-form solution for the unique stationary equilibrium so that the model
can be analyzed tractably. I also study the e®ects on the equilibrium of changes in growth
of technology, riskiness of technology, starting distribution of technology, ¯xed operating cost,
entry cost, bankruptcy cost, and corporate tax.
I now highlight the main mechanism operating in the model by an example. Consider the
e®ect of an increase in technology growth in a risk-neutral environment. First, this increase has
a cash °ow e®ect, in the sense that operating pro¯ts are higher. It also has an option e®ect in
the sense that it changes the expected appreciation in the value of the option to default. These
two e®ects raise ¯rm value and the bene¯t of remaining active. Thus, the ¯rm is less likely
to default, and has lower expected bankruptcy costs. The standard single-¯rm tradeo® theory
then predicts that the ¯rm should issue more debt. However, the prediction that high growth
¯rms have high leverage is refuted by many empirical studies (see Rajan and Zingales (1995),
Barclay, Morellec, and Smith (2002), and references cited therein).
In the present industry equilibrium model, there is an important price feedback e®ect associ-
ated with an increase in technology growth. That is, potential entrants will anticipate increased
¯rm value and hence prefer to enter the industry. As a result, product market competition
causes the output price to fall. The decreased output price in°uences the ¯rm's ¯nancing and
liquidation/exit decisions. In particular, in contrast to standard single-¯rm tradeo® models, this
feedback e®ect may dominate so as to raise exit probabilities, lower coupon payments, and lower
the average industry leverage ratio.
The model also has important implications for industry dynamics. Speci¯cally, an increase
in the rate of technology growth and the induced increase in the exit threshold have a selection
e®ect in that the stationary distribution of surviving ¯rms changes. This selection e®ect causes
ine±cient ¯rms to exit and be replaced by new entrants, thereby leading to higher industry
output and a lower turnover rate.
2The present paper relates to three strands of literature. One strand beginning with Black
and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) is in the framework of dynamic contingent claims analysis.
Brennan and Schwartz (1984), Mello and Parsons (1992), Mauer and Triantis (1994), and Titman
and Tsyplakov (2002) analyze the interaction between investment and ¯nancing decisions using
numerical methods. Dixit (1989) studies entry and exit decisions under all-equity ¯nancing.
Leland (1994, 1998), Leland and Toft (1996), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), and Morellec
(2001) analyze corporate asset valuation and optimal capital structure using analytical methods.
All these models consider a single-¯rm environment. Under perfect competition, Leahy (1993)
analyzes entry and exit under all equity ¯nancing in an industry equilibrium framework. Fries,
Miller, and Perraudin (1997) generalize Leahy's model and study how entry and exit a®ect
corporate asset valuation and capital structure.5 Lambrecht (2001) analyzes the impact of debt
¯nancing on entry and exit in an oligopoly environment.
Another strand is based on the framework developed by Hopenhayn (1992a, 1992b) and
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), where the concept of stationary equilibrium is introduced to
analyze industry dynamics. Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chapter 8) study industry investment in
a similar framework. They assume ¯rms exit the industry exogenously through sudden deaths.
Most papers in this strand assume that ¯rms are all-equity ¯nanced. Cooley and Quadrini
(2001) introduce capital structure decisions into this framework and study how ¯nancial frictions
account for the negative dependence of ¯rm dynamics (growth, job reallocation, and exit) on size
and age. They assume exogenous exit and consider standard one-period debt contracts based
on asymmetric information.
The third strand of literature is based on strategic models. Some papers in this strand
(Brander and Lewis (1986, 1988) and Maksimovic (1988)) argue that product market compe-
tition becomes \tougher" when leverage increases, while others (e.g., Poitevin (1989), Bolton
and Scharfstein (1990), and Dasgupta and Titman (1998)) reach the opposite conclusion. Since
most models in this strand are essentially static, it seems that they are not suitable to address
the questions of industry dynamics and corporate asset valuation.
My model combines elements of the ¯rst two strands of literature. In particular, I incorporate
capital structure decisions into the framework of Hopenhayn (1992a), using the contingent claims
analysis. This allows me to derive a number of new predictions regarding the relation between
leverage and ¯rm turnover. My model is also closely related to Fries, Miller, and Perraudin (1997)
and Lambrecht (2001). Unlike Lambrecht (2001), I study perfectly competitive industries. In
addition, unlike these two papers, where uncertainty comes from aggregate industry demand
shocks, I assume that ¯rms face idiosyncratic technology shocks as in Hopenhayn (1992a). The
basic intuition behind the di®erence between ¯rm-speci¯c shocks and industry-wide shocks is
explained in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 8).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I sets up the model. Section
3II studies a single ¯rm's optimal capital structure choice in an industry setting. Section III
derives closed-form solutions for the unique equilibrium. Section IV analyzes properties of the
equilibrium. Section V concludes. Technical details are relegated to appendices.
I. The Model
Consider an industry consisting of a large number of ¯rms. Suppose information is perfect and
all investors are risk neutral and discount future cash °ows at a constant risk-free rate r > 0:
The assumption of risk neutrality does not lose any generality. If agents are risk averse, the
analysis may be conducted under the risk-neutral measure (see Harrison and Kreps (1979)).
Time is continuous and varies over [0;1). Uncertainty is represented by a probability space
(­;F;P) over which all stochastic processes are de¯ned. The objective is to study long-run
stationary industry equilibria in which all industry-wide aggregate variables are constant (see
Section I.D for a formal de¯nition). In particular, the equilibrium output price is constant, and
there is an equilibrium stationary distribution of surviving ¯rms.
A. Industry Demand
Industry demand is given by a decreasing function. For simplicity, take the following iso-
elastic functional form:
p = Y ¡ 1
"; (1)
where p is the output price, Y is the industry output, and " > 0 is the price elasticity of demand.
B. Firms
There is a continuum of ¯rms. Firms behave competitively, taking prices of output and input
as given. At each date, each ¯rm su®ers independently exogenous death under the Poisson
process with parameter ´ > 0: This assumption captures the fact that some ¯rms exit the
industry for reasons that are not related to bankruptcy. In addition, it is important to ensure
the existence of a stationary distribution of ¯rms, since the technology shock is a nonstationary
process, as I describe next.
Technology Each ¯rm rents capital at the rental rate R to produce output with the production
function F : R+ ! R+; F(k) = kº; where º 2 (0;1): The decreasing-returns-to-scale assumption
ensures that the ¯rm's pro¯t is positive so that the decision problem of entry and exit studied
below is meaningful. Capital depreciates continuously at a constant rate ± > 0: Thus, the rental
rate R is equal to r + ±:
Firms are ex ante identical in that their technology or productivity shocks are drawn from
the same distribution. They di®er ex post in the realization of idiosyncratic shocks. Suppose
4that there is no aggregate uncertainty, and a law of large numbers for a continuum of random
variables is such that industry aggregates are constant (see Judd (1985), Feldman and Gilles
(1985), and Miao (2004) for discussion in the discrete time case).
For an individual ¯rm, the technology shock process (zt)t¸0 is governed by a geometric
Brownian motion:
dzt=zt = ¹zdt + ¾zdWt; (2)
where ¹z and ¾z are positive constants: Here (Wt)t¸0 is a standard Brownian motion representing
¯rm-speci¯c uncertainty:
Pro¯t Function At each time, each ¯rm incurs a ¯xed operating cost cf > 0 to produce
output. Corporate income is taxed at the rate ¿ with full loss-o®set provisions:6 De¯ne the
after-tax pro¯t function ª as
ª(z;p) = max
k¸0
(1 ¡ ¿)(pzF(k) ¡ ±k ¡ cf) ¡ rk: (3)
Notice that according to the U.S. tax system, the depreciation of capital is tax-deductible,
but the interest cost of capital is not. Pro¯t maximization implies the following neoclassical
investment rule:
pzF0(k) = r=(1 ¡ ¿) + ±: (4)
That is, the marginal product of capital is equal to the tax-adjusted user cost of capital. Using




r=(1 ¡ ¿) + ±
¶°
; y(z;p) = zF(k(z;p)) = z°
µ
pº








Substituting the above equations into (3) yields the after-tax pro¯t function
ª(z;p) = (1 ¡ ¿)[a(p)z° ¡ cf]; (7)
where
a(p) ´ p°(1 ¡ º)
µ
º
r=(1 ¡ ¿) + ±
¶º°
: (8)
It is convenient to de¯ne the before-tax pro¯t function
¼(z;p) ´ a(p)z° ¡ cf: (9)
This function will be used repeatedly below.
5Debt Contracts Because interest payments to debt are tax deductible, each ¯rm has an
incentive to issue debt. In order to stay in a time-homogenous environment, I consider debt
contracts with in¯nite maturity, as in Leland (1994) and Du±e and Lando (2001). Debt is issued
at par. The debt contract speci¯es a perpetual °ow of coupon payments b to bondholders. The
remaining cash °ows from operation accrue to shareholders. If the ¯rm defaults on its debt
obligations, it is immediately liquidated. Upon default, bondholders get the liquidation value
and shareholders get nothing.
Liquidation Value Suppose that debt reorganization is so costly that after default the ¯rm is
immediately liquidated and exits the industry.7 I model liquidation value as a fraction ® 2 (0;1)
of the unlevered ¯rm value A(z;p): The remaining fraction accounts for bankruptcy costs. One
can model liquidation value as a general function of the output price X(p) as in Fries, Miller,
and Perraudin (1997). Here, I follow Mello and Parsons (1992). Unlevered ¯rm value is equal
to the after-tax present value of pro¯ts, plus the option value associated with abandonment
opportunities. Normalize the abandonment value of the ¯rm to zero. The ¯rm then chooses an
abandonment time T so that unlevered ¯rm value can be formally described as








where the maximization is over the set T of all stopping times relative to the ¯ltration generated
by the Brownian motion (Wt)t¸0; Ez is the expectation operator for the process (zt)t¸0 starting
at z, and the factor e¡´t accounts for the possibility of Poisson deaths.
Investment and Liquidation Decisions At each date t, after servicing coupon payments
b, residual cash °ows (1 ¡ ¿)(pztF(kt) ¡ ±kt ¡ cf ¡ b) ¡ rkt are distributed to shareholders as
dividends. Shareholders select the investment and default policy to maximize the value of their
claims, taking price p as given. Assume that default is triggered by the decision of shareholders
to cease raising additional equity to meet the coupon payment, as in Mello and Parsons (1992),
Leland (1994), Fries, Miller, and Perraudin (1997), Lambrecht (2001), and Du±e and Lando
(2001).
The following problem describes the investment and liquidation decisions made by a typical






e¡(r+´)t [(1 ¡ ¿)(pztF(kt) ¡ ±kt ¡ cf ¡ b) ¡ rkt]dt
¾
: (11)









6where ¼(zt;p) is given in (9). The expression e(z;b;p) represents the equity value of the ¯rm.
Since one can show that it is increasing in z, the default decision is described by a trigger policy
whereby the ¯rm is immediately liquidated and exits the industry once its technology shock
(zt)t¸0 falls below an endogenously determined threshold zd(b;p) (see Du±e and Lando (2001)).
In what follows, without risk of confusion, I may simply use zd to denote zd(b;p):
The equity-value-maximizing investment policy is similar to that described by the neoclas-
sical rule (4). The di®erence is that here, investment takes place only in the no-default region
z > zd(b;p): This is related to the underinvestment problem of debt pointed out by Myers (1977)
and is consistent with the empirical evidence mentioned in the introduction.
Notice that the limited liability feature of equity is embodied in problem (11) since equity
value is always positive before default (z > zd(b;p)); and is zero only upon default (z = zd(b;p)):
Debt Value and Firm Value The arbitrage-free value of debt is equal to the sum of the
present value of coupon payments accruing to bondholders until the default time and the present











where Ty denotes the ¯rst time that the process (zt)t¸0 falls to some boundary value y > 0:
Firm value v(z;b;p) is the sum of equity value and debt value,
v(z;b;p) = e(z;b;p) + d(z;b;p): (14)
Entry and Financing At each date there is a continuum of potential entrants. Upon entry
¯rms incur a ¯xed sunk cost ce: This cost can be ¯nanced by equity and debt. After entry,
a ¯rm's initial level of technology z is drawn from the distribution ³; which is uniform over
[z;z]: This ¯rm is then in the same position as an incumbent with the initial level of technology
z: However, ¯rms di®er over time because they may experience di®erent idiosyncratic shocks.
Notice that the uniform entry distribution is important to derive a closed-form solution for the
stationary distribution of incumbents.
Assume that z > zd(b;p). Since zd is endogenous, this assumption must be veri¯ed in
equilibrium. I rule out the case in which the initial draw of the technology shock is below the
default threshold so that the entrant is immediately liquidated and exits the industry.
Before entry, ¯rms are identical and they do not know their initial technology levels and
subsequent random evolution of technology. In a competitive equilibrium, if there is positive
entry, then the expected bene¯t of entry must be equal to the entry cost. That is, the following
7entry condition must hold, Z z
z
v(z;b;p)³(dz) = ce: (15)
Finally, upon entry ¯rms may adjust the capital structure in order to balance the bene¯t
and cost of debt. The optimal coupon rate b¤(p) is chosen to maximize the expected value of
the ¯rm,
R z
z v(z;b;p)³(dz). Since all ¯rms are ex ante identical, they choose the same optimal
coupon rate. For tractability, I assume that ¯rms do not re-adjust debt after entry, as in most
contingent claims models of capital structure.
Timeline for Decisions In summary, the sequence of events and the timing of decisions for
a typical ¯rm are described in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
C. Aggregation
In a long-run steady state, there is a stationary distribution of surviving ¯rms ¹ and a
constant entry rate N.8 Note that the distribution ¹ is not a probability measure. For any
Borel set B in the real line, ¹(B) describes the number of surviving ¯rms whose technology
shocks lie in the set B. Since a ¯rm exits when its technology shock falls below zd(b;p); the
support of ¹ is the interval [zd(b;p);1): Using this stationary distribution, aggregate variables





where y(z;p) is given in (5). Intuitively, suppose z takes ¯nitely many values zi 2 [zd(b;p);1);
i = 1;:::n; and ¹(zi) is the mass of surviving ¯rms whose technology level is zi: Then industry






A stationary industry equilibrium with exogenous leverage, (p¤;ze;N¤;¹¤); consists of a con-
stant output price p¤; an exit threshold ze = zd(b;p¤), an entry rate N¤; and a distribution of
incumbents ¹¤ such that: (i) Firms solve problem (11); (ii) the market clears
p¤ = Y (¹¤;b;p¤)¡1="; (18)
where Y (¢) is given in (16); (iii) the entry condition (15) holds; and, (iv) the distribution ¹¤ is
an invariant measure over [ze;1):
8In this equilibrium, the coupon rate b is exogenously given. When b is chosen to maximize
¯rm value, the resulting equilibrium is called the stationary equilibrium with endogenous leverage.
Such an equilibrium is denoted by (po; zo
e;No;¹o):
Conditions (i)-(iii) in the above de¯nition are standard requirements for a competitive equi-
librium. Condition (iv) requires that, in a long-run steady state, the distribution of ¯rms be
constant over time. This is possible because there is a continuum of ¯rms that are subject to id-
iosyncratic shocks and a law of large numbers is assumed. As pointed out by Dixit and Pindyck
(1994, p.277), \at the industry level, the shocks and responses of ¯rms can aggregate into long-
run stationary conditions, so that the industry output and price are nonrandom. However, the
equilibrium level of these variables are a®ected by the parameters of ¯rm-speci¯c uncertainty.
Also, behind the aggregate certainty lies a great deal of randomness and °uctuations: ¯rms
enter, invest, and exit in response to the shocks to their individual fortunes."
To better understand condition (iv), it is helpful to use a discrete time approximation similar
to that in Hopenhayn (1992a). The following equation describes the evolution of ¯rm distribu-
tions:
¹t+dt(B) = (1 ¡ ´dt)
Z 1
ze
Q(Bjz)¹t(dz) + N¤³([z;z] \ B)dt: (19)
The interpretation is as follows: At any date t; let ¹t be the distribution of ¯rms at date t:
After an instant dt; ¯rms transit to the set B at date t+dt according to the transition function
Q(Bjz): Each ¯rm survives with probability (1 ¡ ´dt): Moreover, each ¯rm exits the industry
when its technology shocks fall below ze: Thus, the ¯rst term in (19) describes the mass of ¯rms
that lie in the set B at date t + dt: The second term in (19) describes the mass of new entrants
entering the set B. The sum of these two terms is equal to the total mass of ¯rms that lie in
the set B at date t + dt, which is ¹t+dt(B): In the long-run stationary equilibrium, this mass
must not change over time. This determines the invariant distribution ¹¤ (B). Notice that ¯rms
are identi¯ed by the technology levels z. The mass of ¯rms with technology levels lying in B is
constant over time. However, the actual identities of ¯rms occupying these positions may keep
changing.
II. Optimal Capital Structure
In this section, I ¯x the output price p and consider a single ¯rm's capital structure decision.
This decision is modelled in the spirit of the standard EBIT-based single-¯rm contingent claims
models, such as Mello and Parsons (1992) and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001). However,
di®erent from these models, investment policies are not ¯xed and the product market in°uences
the capital structure decision through the output price.
A. Unlevered Firm Value
9I begin by deriving unlevered ¯rm value. Because unlevered ¯rm value is increasing in z; the
solution to (10) is described by a threshold value zA: The ¯rm is abandoned the ¯rst time the
technology shock falls below zA: To solve for this threshold value zA and unlevered ¯rm value,
let






be unlevered ¯rm value given any threshold level y > 0: Here Ty denotes the ¯rst passage time








The following proposition describes unlevered ¯rm value and the abandonment decision.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose
¸ ´ r + ´ ¡ ¹z° ¡ ¾2
z°(° ¡ 1)=2 > 0: (22)
Then unlevered ¯rm value is given by




































(# ¡ °)(r + ´)a(p)
¸1=°
: (26)
The ¯rm is abandoned the ¯rst time its technology process falls below the threshold value zA:
Note that ¦(z;p) in (25) represents the before-tax present value of the pro¯t °ow. As-
sumption (22) ensures that ¦(z;p) is ¯nite. Equation (23) implies that unlevered ¯rm value





r+´ < 0; the ¯rm is not abandoned as soon as losses are incurred: Only if
the ¯rm's technology shock is bad enough, is the ¯rm abandoned { because abandonment is
irreversible and waiting has positive option value.
B. Liquidation Decision and Levered Equity Value
Recall that the ¯rm's liquidation decision is described by a trigger policy. To solve for equity
value and the optimal default threshold zd, let






10denote the equity value when the default threshold is given by y and the coupon rate is given
by b:
Since shareholders may always cover operating losses by raising additional equity, they choose
a default threshold y so as to maximize equity value e(z;b;pjy). The optimal default threshold







The following proposition describes equity value and liquidation decisions.
PROPOSITION 2: Let assumption (22) hold. Then equity value is given by



















(# ¡ °)(r + ´)a(p)
¸1=°
: (30)
The ¯rm is liquidated the ¯rst time its technology shock falls below the threshold value zd (b;p):
Equation (29) implies that equity value is equal to the after-tax value of the present value
of the pro¯t °ow, minus the present value of coupon payments, plus the option value of default.
Similar to abandonment, default is irreversible and waiting to default has positive option value.







This implies that the optimal liquidation policy for shareholders consists in liquidating when
the present value of the pro¯t °ow upon default ¦(zd;p) is equal to the cost of servicing debt
b=(r + ´) multiplied by the factor #=(# ¡ °) 2 (0;1) that represents an option value of waiting
to default. It is important to note that product market behavior a®ects the liquidation decision
because the output price a®ects the present value of the pro¯t °ow.
Equation (30) also implies that the liquidation threshold zd(b;p) is increasing in b and de-
creasing in p (note that a(p) given in (8) is increasing in p): Thus, higher debt or lower output
prices cause the ¯rm to exit earlier. Higher debt also induces underinvestment as in Myers
(1977) in the sense that the range of the states over which investment takes place is smaller.
C. Debt Value and Levered Firm Value
Using the standard contingent claims analysis, one can derive debt value and ¯rm value from
equations (13)-(14).













; z ¸ zd; (32)
and ¯rm value is given by














; z ¸ zd: (33)
Equation (32) demonstrates that debt value is equal to the present value of coupon payments,
plus the probability-adjusted changes in value if and when default occurs. Note that under the
present speci¯cation of liquidation value, one can show that ®A(zd;p) < b
r+´; so debt is risky,
that is, d(z;b;p) < b
r+´.
By de¯nition, levered ¯rm value is the sum of equity value and debt value as given in (29)
and (32): Equation (33) demonstrates that levered ¯rm value equals unlevered ¯rm value plus
the probability-adjusted tax shield of debt minus probability-adjusted bankruptcy costs.
D. Optimal Coupon
Upon entry, the ¯rm adjusts its capital structure to balance the bene¯t and cost of debt.






Since it can be shown that v is strictly concave in b; the following ¯rst-order condition determines





































where the liquidation threshold zd is given by (30).
The expression on the left side of equation (35) represents the probability-adjusted marginal
tax advantage of debt and the expression on the right side represents the marginal bankruptcy
cost. In particular, the ¯rst term on the right side represents the loss of marginal tax shield due
to bankruptcy. The second term on the right side represents the loss of marginal liquidation
value due to an ine±cient choice of liquidation time by the shareholder. The optimal capital
structure prescribes a coupon rate so that the marginal bene¯t of debt equals the marginal cost.
12The present model implies that product market competition in°uences the ¯rm's ¯nancing
decisions since industry output prices a®ect the optimal coupon rate: This is transparent when
there is no ¯xed operating cost (cf = 0): In this case, there is a closed-form solution to (35):
b¤(p) =















This equation implies that the optimal coupon is increasing in the output price p. The intuition
is that when the output price p is higher, the ¯rm is less likely to default so that it prefers to
issue more debt.
E. Agency Costs
Given the coupon rate b and the technology shock z, the ¯rm's ¯rst-best liquidation policy is
to choose a liquidation threshold zFB
d so as to maximize ¯rm value, instead of equity value. Since
upon default the ¯rm only recovers a fraction of unlevered ¯rm value, it prefers to postpone
default as long as possible in order to bene¯t from tax shields. However, the ¯rm also incurs
the ¯xed operating cost, and hence eventually su®ers losses. The ¯rst-best liquidation threshold
must be chosen to trade o® these bene¯ts and costs.
Due to the con°ict of interest between shareholders and bondholders, the ¯rst-best liqui-
dation policy cannot be enforced ex post. These agency costs are measured by the di®erence
between the ¯rst-best ¯rm value and ¯rm value under the liquidation policy chosen by the
shareholder. The following proposition describes the ¯rst-best liquidation policy, ¯rm value,
and agency costs.
PROPOSITION 4: Let assumption (22) hold. Then the ¯rst-best ¯rm value is given by










where zA is given by (26). Under the ¯rst-best liquidation policy, the ¯rm is liquidated the ¯rst



















This proposition demonstrates that the ¯rst-best liquidation threshold is equal to the aban-
donment threshold value zA; that is, zFB
d = zA: Since Propositions 1-2 show that zA < zd;
the equity-maximizing liquidation policy implies an ine±cient early liquidation time. Equation
(37) shows that the ¯rst-best ¯rm value is equal to unlevered ¯rm value plus the probability-
adjusted tax shield. Equation (38) shows that agency costs consist of the loss of tax shields
due to ine±cient early liquidation plus the probability-adjusted liquidation costs. Since # < 0
and zA < zd; it follows from (38) that agency costs decrease with the technology level z for any
13¯xed coupon rate b: This implies that agency costs are less severe for more e±cient ¯rms. The
intuition is that more e±cient ¯rms are less likely to default and hence the loss of tax shields
and probability-adjusted liquidation costs are smaller.
III. Stationary Equilibrium
This section analyzes the existence and uniqueness of stationary equilibrium. I ¯rst consider
the case in which leverage is exogenous. Then I consider the case in which leverage is chosen to
maximize ¯rm value.
A. Equilibrium with Exogenous Leverage
Throughout this subsection, the coupon rate b is assumed to be ¯xed exogenously. The
following proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of stationary equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose
r + ´ > ¹z° + ¾2
z°(° ¡ 1)=2; (39)















z ¡ ¹; (41)
where ° = 1=(1 ¡ º): Then there is a unique stationary equilibrium with the coupon rate b ¸ 0;
(p¤;ze;N¤;¹¤), such that z > ze.9
I ¯rst comment on the assumptions. As explained earlier, assumption (39) ensures that the
present value of pro¯ts is ¯nite. Assumption (40) ensures that certain high-order moments of
the scaled stationary distribution is ¯nite. This assumption is necessary since the stationary
distribution has an in¯nite support and the moments are improper integrals. Assumption (41)
is important for the existence of a stationary distribution.10 It simply says that the Poisson
death rate cannot be too small. The reason lies in the fact that the geometric Brownian motion
technology process (zt)t¸0 is nonstationary. Heuristically, without Poisson deaths, the number
of ¯rms with high technology levels can explode and a stationary distribution cannot exist. One
needs to assume a su±ciently high death rate to prevent this explosion. From this argument, one
can deduce that the Poisson death assumption is not needed if (zt)t¸0 is a stationary process, for
example, the mean-reverting process. However, the mean-reverting technology process does not
permit any intuitive closed-form solution for the stationary equilibrium. Consequently, complex
numerical methods are needed. This is typical in the discrete time models (e.g. Hopenhayn
(1992b), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Cooley and Quadrini (2001)). Finally, the condition
z > ze guarantees that the initial draw of the technology shock cannot be so bad that the
¯rm has no incentive to enter the industry. Since ze = zd (b;p¤); it follows from (30) that this
condition requires that the ¯xed cost cf is not too big.
14Note that when there is no debt (i.e., b = 0), ¯rms are all-equity ¯nanced and the model
reduces to the one similar to the discrete time industry dynamics model studied by Hopenhayn
(1992a). As mentioned earlier, one important di®erence is that here the technology shock is
modelled as a nonstationary process, whereas it is modelled as a stationary process in Hopenhayn
(1992a).
I now outline the intuition behind the theorem and relegate the detailed proof to the ap-
pendix. The proof is by construction, which follows from a similar procedure described in both
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chapter 8). It consists of three
steps.
In the ¯rst step, I use the entry condition (15) to determine the equilibrium output price
p¤. It is easy to show that ¯rm value is strictly increasing in the output price: When the output
price is high enough, expected ¯rm value exceeds the entry cost ce, and potential entrants have
incentives to enter the industry. As more ¯rms enter the industry, market competition drives
down the output price. On the other hand, when the output price is low enough, expected ¯rm
value may be lower than the entry cost. In this case, no ¯rm prefers to enter the industry. In
sum, if there is positive entry, the equilibrium output price p¤ must be such that the expected
¯rm value equals the entry cost, which is the entry condition (15). To show that there is a unique
solution p¤ to (15), observe the following: As price p goes to in¯nity, the ¯rm makes unbounded
pro¯ts and hence ¯rm value goes to in¯nity. However, as p goes to zero, the ¯rm becomes
unpro¯table so that it is abandoned and ¯rm value goes to zero. Thus, a unique equilibrium
output price p¤ is determined using the intermediate value theorem, as illustrated in Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
In the second step, I solve for the invariant distribution ¹¤. I ¯rst solve for the exit threshold
and the support of ¹¤: Given the equilibrium output price p¤, the equilibrium exit threshold
ze = zd(b;p¤) is determined using equation (30). This threshold value is exactly analogous to
the corresponding formula for the single-¯rm liquidation decision described in Section II. The
intuition is similar to that discussed in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chapter 8). When uncertainty
is ¯rm-speci¯c, a ¯rm that observes a favorable shock z has an edge over its competitors. Its
favorable z cannot be \stolen" by competitors. Thus, a positive value of waiting does survive,
and the standard single-¯rm option value analysis can be embedded in an industry equilibrium
model.
Since ine±cient ¯rms with technology levels lower than ze exit the industry, the support of
the stationary distribution of incumbents ¹¤ is given by [ze;1): Note that equation (19) implies
that ¹¤ is linearly homogenous in the entry rate N¤. Thus, it is convenient to scale ¹¤ by the
factor N¤ when solving it. In Appendix A, I derive the scaled density of ¹¤ using the method
described in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chapter 8). The main idea of this method follows from
15the intuitive description given in Section I.D. That is, in order for the density to be constant
over time, the rate at which ¯rms arrive at any technology level because of entry must be equal
to the rate at which ¯rms move away from that level because of Poisson deaths or bankruptcy.
In the ¯nal step, the entry rate N¤ is determined by the market-clearing condition (18).
Since the stationary distribution ¹¤ is proportional to the entry rate N¤; it follows from (16)
that industry output supply Y (¹¤;b;p¤) is also proportional to N¤: Equating the industry
demand p¤ = Y (¹¤;b;p¤)
¡1=" yields the entry rate N¤:
B. Equilibrium with Endogenous Leverage
When each ¯rm chooses value-maximizing capital structure, it selects the coupon rate b¤(p)
to solve problem (34). The equilibrium output price po is then the solution to the following
equation derived from the entry condition:
Z z
z
v(z;b¤(p);p)³(dz) = ce: (42)
Now, the equilibrium with endogenous leverage can be characterized in the same manner
as that with exogenous leverage except for the following changes: (i) The output price p¤ is
replaced by the above value po; (ii) the coupon rate b takes the value bo ´ b¤(po); and, (iii) the
exit threshold ze takes the value zo
e = ze(bo;po). The detailed computation of the equilibrium
(bo;po;zo
e;No;¹o) is described in Appendix B.
Importantly, if there is no ¯xed operating cost (i.e., cf = 0), then the equilibrium with
endogenous leverage can be characterized completely in closed form.
PROPOSITION 6: Let assumptions (39)-(41) hold. Also assume cf = 0: Then the unique
stationary equilibrium with optimal leverage (po;zo











































r=(1 ¡ ¿) + ±
¶¡º°
; (45)
where Nofo is the density of the stationary distribution ¹o and its explicit expression is given
in the appendix. Moreover, the optimal coupon rate is given by
bo =















16Equation (43) implies that the exit threshold does not depend on the equilibrium output
price. This result does not hold true if there are positive ¯xed operating costs. In fact, when
there are positive ¯xed costs, the equilibrium output price has an important feedback e®ect on
the exit threshold and hence on the production and ¯nancing decisions, as illustrated in the
simulations below. Note that equation (44) implies that the equilibrium output price increases
with entry cost. Although it is often argued that the entry cost should not play a role in
subsequent price competition, as it is a sunk cost, the present model demonstrates that this
sunk cost may feed back into the entry rate and consequently in the output price. In particular,
a high entry cost discourages entry and hence protects incumbents. Thus, competition is less
intense and the output price becomes higher.
To close this section, I introduce the concept of turnover rate. The turnover rate is an impor-
tant measure of industry dynamics (see Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) and Hopenhayn
(1992a)). The turnover rate of entry is de¯ned as the ratio of the mass of entrants to the mass of
incumbents. The turnover rate of exit can be de¯ned similarly. Since in a stationary equilibrium
the entry rate is equal to the exit rate, these two measures of turnover are equal. Appendix
B presents the explicit expressions for the turnover rate as well as other important equilibrium
variables. In particular, the formula for the turnover rate (B5) implies that the turnover rate is
determined exclusively by the exit threshold and the scaled stationary distribution of ¯rms.
IV. Results
To examine the implications of the model, I ¯rst calibrate a base case model. I then conduct
simulations based on this model. For all simulations, input parameter values are chosen such
that the conditions of Proposition 5 are satis¯ed.
A. Parameter Values
The base case model studies the equilibrium with endogenous leverage described in Propo-
sition 6. The parameter values are either taken from estimated values from the data or chosen
such that the model's equilibrium behavior matches some measured statistics as closely as pos-
sible. They are used as an illustrative benchmark. Some parameter values can be ¯ne-tuned as
in the real business cycle literature (e.g., Kydland and Prescott (1982)).
I ¯rst set the ¯xed operating cost cf = 0 so that there is a closed-form solution to the unique
equilibrium. I then set the price elasticity of demand " = 0:75: This number is within the range
estimated by Phillips (1995).
Next, I calibrate parameters related to technology. Set the returns-to-scale parameter º =
0:40; as estimated by Caballero and Engel (1999). This implies ° = 1=(1 ¡ º) = 1:667: As in
the business cycle literature, set the depreciation rate of capital ± = 0:1. In order to calibrate
17the drift ¹z and volatility ¾z; use ¼(zt;p) to proxy a ¯rm's cash °ow. The growth rate and
volatility of cash °ows are roughly equal to 2:5% and 25%, respectively, for a typical Standard
& Poor's 500 ¯rm. Thus, apply Ito's Lemma to equation (3) to derive that ¾z = 0:25=° = 15%
and ¹z = (0:025 ¡ 0:5°(° ¡ 1)¾2
z)=° = 0:75%
Set the risk-free r = 5:22% so that it is equal to the average rate on Treasury bills, as
reported in Standard & Poor's The Outlook in 2001. Set the corporate tax rate ¿ = 34%; as
estimated by Graham (1996). Set the bankruptcy cost parameter 1 ¡ ® = 20%; which is at the
upper bound of recent estimates reported in Andrade and Kaplan (1998).
Set the Poisson death parameter ´ = 4%: This number follows from the facts that the
annual turnover rate is roughly 7% (see Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) and Hopenhayn
(1992b)) and that the default rate is roughly 3% (see Brady and Bos (2002)).
It remains to calibrate the parameters ce; z; and z: First, follow Hopenhayn (1992b) and
normalize the equilibrium output price po = 1: Next, use equation (42) to determine ce once z
and z are known. Finally, choose values for z and z so that the following numbers are roughly
matched: (i) The average industry Tobin's q is equal to 2:7; which is in the range estimated by
Lindenberg and Ross (1981); and, (ii) the turnover rate is 7%.
The base case parameter values are summarized in Table I.
[Insert Table I here]
B. The Base Case Model
The equilibrium for the base case model is reported in Panel 1 of Table II. It shows that the
average industry leverage ratio is equal to 23:09%: This number is close to the historical average
leverage ratio (25%) reported in Barclay, Morellec, and Smith (2002). To compare with the
standard single-¯rm EBIT-based contingent claims model, I adopt the same parameter values
for a single risk-neutral ¯rm. The optimal leverage ratio is 71:59%; which is much higher than
that typically observed in practice.11 The main reason that the present model predicts low
leverage is that I compute equilibrium average industry leverage level, instead of a single ¯rm's
leverage. In a stationary equilibrium, there are not many surviving ¯rms that have high leverage
ratios.
[Insert Table II Here]
















18The value is 7:08%; which is close to the estimate (9:7%) reported in Graham (2000).
Figure 3 plots the stationary distribution of surviving ¯rms. This ¯gure implies that more
e±cient ¯rms are less likely to exit, since they have higher technology (productivity) levels
which are farther away from the exit threshold. This prediction is consistent with the empirical
¯nding reported by Kovenock and Phillips (1997). Since the size of a ¯rm measured by either
output y (z;p) or input k(z;p) is an increasing function of its technology shock z; the long-run
size (probability) distribution plotted in Figure 4 has a similar shape to that plotted in Figure
3. Notice that the size distribution does not depend on ¯rm age. The issue of size and age
dependence is studied by Cooley and Quadrini (2001).
[Insert Figures 3-4]
Another property of the base case model is that although all ¯rms in the industry are ex
ante identical, and hence pay the same coupon amount, the leverage ratios vary across ¯rms. In
particular, small or ine±cient ¯rms take on high leverage. This is because surviving ¯rms di®er
in realizations of technology shocks so that they have di®erent equity values. 12 This result is
related to the empirical ¯nding of Welch (2004) that leverage changes are mainly determined by
equity returns.
Simulations reported in Table II also reveal that the average industry agency cost accounts
for 2:57% of the ¯rst-best average industry ¯rm value. In later simulations, I ¯nd that the
magnitude of the average industry agency cost is approximately 2% for a wide range of parameter
values. Thus, the agency costs arising from the con°ict of interest between shareholders and
bondholders are quite small. A similar ¯nding is reported in Parrino and Weisbach (1999).
The present model implies that competition can mitigate the bondholder-shareholder agency
problem. This is because ine±cient ¯rms have high agency costs as discussed in Section II.E,
but they cannot survive in an industry equilibrium.
To compare with Hopenhayn's (1992a) industry dynamics model without debt ¯nancing, I
set the ¯xed operating cost cf = 5 and compute equilibria with and without debt ¯nancing:
The equilibrium outcome for the model with debt ¯nancing is reported in the 12th row of Table
II. By contrast, when ¯rms do not take into account tax advantages of debt and are all-equity
¯nanced, industry output is 0:72; the turnover rate is 4:77%; and average industry ¯rm value
is 372:12, all of which are lower than the model with debt ¯nancing. Thus, debt ¯nancing not
only raises ¯rm value,13 but also facilitates e±cient exit and increases industry output. The
intuition is simple. Debt increases the exit threshold (see equations (26) and (30)), and hence
induces ine±cient ¯rms to exit. In addition, increased ¯rm value promotes entry. Competition
then drives down the output price and raises industry output.
C. Comparative Statics
19Since capital structure and production decisions may simultaneously respond to changes
in exogenous factors, I focus on the stationary equilibrium with optimal leverage described in
Section III.B and examine comparative static properties of the equilibrium based on the base
case model studied earlier.
Technology Growth and Entry Distribution Panel 2 of Table II details the e®ect of
changes in technology growth. As argued in the introduction, the standard single-¯rm tradeo®
model cannot explain the empirical evidence that high growth ¯rms have low leverage. However,
in the present industry equilibrium framework, the trade-o® theory can still explain this fact.
This is because the price feedback e®ect discussed in the introduction plays an important role.
Simulations reported in Table II show that this e®ect dominates so that the optimal coupon
rate falls and the liquidation threshold rises with technology growth ¹z: Simulations also reveal
that the tax bene¯t of debt falls and average industry leverage falls with ¹z:
Since the market-to-book ratio is positively related to technology growth,14 it is negatively
related to leverage. The usual interpretation of this fact is based on the underinvestment problem
of debt identi¯ed by Myers (1977) or the free cash °ow theory of Jensen (1986). Two recent
interpretations are o®ered by Welch (2004) and Baker and Wurgler (2002). The present model,
however, o®ers a new interpretation in an industry equilibrium setting.
To examine why the price feedback e®ect may dominate and how robust the result is, consider













where I have substituted the expressions for a(p) and ¸ in (8) and (22). If ¦(z;p) is price elastic
(i.e., ° > 1); and if the level and changes of the growth rate ¹z are small, then the decrease
in the price p may well dominate the increase in ¹z: In the present model, under decreasing-
returns-to-scale technology º < 1, ° ´ 1=(1 ¡ º) must be bigger than one. Moreover, for a
typical ¯rm the growth rate of cash °ows and its change are unlikely to be high. Therefore, I
conclude that the result is quite robust for a wide range of reasonable parameter values.
The increase in ¹z also has a positive selection e®ect because it changes the liquidation
threshold and the stationary distribution of ¯rms. Figure 3 illustrates that this e®ect causes
the scaled density function to shift to the right: Thus, to survive in the industry, ¯rms must
have high productivity or technology levels. This makes entry tougher. Thus, the turnover rate
decreases.
Notice that even though the increase in technology growth may cut the present value of
pro¯ts, the average industry equity value and ¯rm value rise with technology growth. Simulations
show that when ¹z increases from 0:75% to 1:5%; average industry equity value increases from
20203:57 to 1338:2 and average industry ¯rm value increases from 264:68 to 1400:8: This is because
those values are computed using the stationary distribution of surviving ¯rms. In addition, the
positive selection e®ect implies that a high growth industry has a greater number of highly
e±cient ¯rms than a low growth industry. These highly e±cient ¯rms have higher equity value
and ¯rm value. Furthermore, simulations show that the size of the high growth industry is much
lower than that of the low growth industry.
The impact of an improvement of the entry distribution (i.e., an increase in z) is similar
to that of an increase in technology growth, as reported in Panel 4 of Table II. So I omit the
discussion.
Riskiness of Technology Panel 3 of Table II documents the e®ect of changes in technology
volatility. As in the standard contingent claims model, the volatility parameter ¾z provides a
measure of bankruptcy risk and hence is an important determinant of leverage. Panel 3 of Table
II reveals that volatility is negatively related to average industry leverage. This prediction is
similar to that in the single-¯rm model and is consistent with the empirical evidence documented
by Titman and Wessels (1988).
Panel 3 of Table II also reveals that volatility is positively related to industry output. This
is because an increase in ¾z has an option e®ect in that it raises the option value of waiting to
default. This results in higher ¯rm value and hence encourages entry. Competition then drives
down the output price and raises industry output. Finally, Panel 3 of Table II reveals that an
increase in volatility has a positive selection e®ect, resulting in a high turnover rate.
Bankruptcy Cost and Corporate Tax Panel 5 of Table II reports the e®ect of changes in
the bankruptcy cost. An increase in the bankruptcy cost parameter 1 ¡ ® has a negative cash
°ow e®ect. This e®ect decreases the value of an active ¯rm and depresses entry. As a result,
the output price rises and industry output falls.
While it is intuitive that bankruptcy costs are negatively related to leverage, Panel 5 of Table
II also reveals that bankruptcy costs are negatively related to the turnover rate. The intuition
is that an increase in the bankruptcy cost lowers debt and hence decreases the opportunity cost
of remaining active. Thus, each incumbent prefers to stay longer in the industry. Consequently,
the liquidation threshold falls. The lower value of the liquidation threshold implies less selection
and higher expected lifetime of ¯rms. As a result, the turnover rate falls.
An increase in the corporate tax rate has the same negative cash °ow e®ect as an increase in
the bankruptcy cost so that industry output falls with the tax rate. However, the increase in the
corporate tax rate raises the tax bene¯t of debt and hence has an opposite e®ect on leverage and
turnover relative to an increase in the bankruptcy cost. The impact of the tax rate is reported
in Panel 6 of Table II. I omit the detailed analysis.
21Fixed Operating Cost So far, I have set the ¯xed operating cost cf to zero. Because the
¯xed cost is related to the degree of economies of scale, I now examine the impact of the ¯xed
operating cost on equilibrium outcomes, as reported in Panel 7 of Table II.15
The panel reveals that the ¯xed cost is positively related to the turnover rate, and negatively
related to industry output and leverage. The intuition is as follows. An increase in the ¯xed
operating cost lowers the operating pro¯t and hence lowers ¯rm value. This depresses entry,
raises the output price, and hence lowers industry output. As reported in Panel 7 of Table II,
the positive price feedback e®ect is dominated so that each incumbent prefers to exit earlier,
resulting in an increased exit threshold and an increased turnover rate.
I now analyze the impact on leverage. While the increased ¯xed cost lowers the tax bene¯t
of debt, it also lowers unlevered ¯rm value and hence bankruptcy costs. Simulations reported
in Panel 7 of Table II reveal that the latter e®ect dominates so that the optimal coupon rises.
Thus, the average industry value of debt also rises. However, due to the positive selection and
price e®ects, average industry ¯rm value also increases with the ¯xed cost. The intuition is that
following an increase in the ¯xed cost, surviving ¯rms are more e±cient since the exit threshold
is higher and the positive price e®ect is stronger for those ¯rms. A similar result is derived
in Hopenhayn (1992a, 1992b) for all-equity ¯nanced ¯rms. Simulations reported in Panel 7 of
Table II show that the increase in ¯rm value dominates the increase in debt value so that average
industry leverage falls with the ¯xed cost.
Entry Cost In the short run, an increase in the entry cost ce does not a®ect a ¯rm's cash
°ows and its liquidation decision. Thus, it does not a®ect the value of an active ¯rm. However,
the entry cost acts as a barrier to entry. High entry costs protect incumbents and drive up
the industry output price. This price feedback e®ect will generally in°uence ¯nancing and exit
decisions.
Speci¯cally, the increase in the output price raises the bene¯t of remaining active and the tax
advantage of debt. On the other hand, this implies that each ¯rm prefers to issue more debt and
hence the optimal coupon rises. This leads to an increased opportunity cost of remaining active.
The impact on the exit threshold depends on these two opposite e®ects as shown in equation
(31). When there is no ¯xed operating cost, these e®ects o®set each other so that changes in
the entry cost do not a®ect the exit threshold (see equation (43)). Consequently, these changes
do not have a selection e®ect.
However, this result is not robust to the introduction of the ¯xed operating cost. To illustrate
this point, I set the operating cost cf = 5: Panel 8 of Table II documents the impact of increases
in the entry cost. It reveals that the entry cost is positively related to leverage and negatively
related to the turnover rate.16 This is because in response to an increase in the entry cost, the
positive price feedback e®ect dominates so that the exit threshold decreases. This results in a
22negative selection e®ect so that the turnover rate falls. This prediction is consistent with the
evidence reported by Orr (1974) for Canadian industry. A similar result is derived by Hopenhayn
(1992a) for all-equity ¯nanced ¯rms. In the present model, a lower exit threshold also induces
lower default/exit probabilities, and hence expected bankruptcy costs are lower. This results in
higher leverage.
Industry Demand Elasticity I now analyze the impact of changes in the demand elasticity,
which is an important industry characteristic. From Proposition 6, one ¯nds surprisingly that
the output price po; the exit threshold zo
e; and the scaled density fo do not depend on the
demand elasticity parameter ": Consequently, the turnover rate and average industry leverage
do not depend on ". However, the change in demand elasticity does have e®ect on industry
output, industry size, and entry rate. As can be seen from Appendix B, this result is also true
for positive ¯xed costs cf > 0: The key intuition is that the competitive entry condition (15),
which determines the equilibrium output price, is independent of the industry demand elastic-
ity. This implies that the industry output price is also independent of the demand elasticity.
Consequently, the exit threshold is independent of the demand elasticity since it is determined
by an individual ¯rm's behavior taking industry prices as given. Since the scaled stationary
distribution is determined by the exit threshold and the exogenous evolution of the technology
process, it is also independent of the demand elasticity.
To illustrate the above result, I set cf = 5 and ¯x other parameter values as in Table I. Panel
9 of Table II illustrates the e®ect of increases in the demand elasticity. I ¯nd that the industry
output, industry size, and entry rate all decrease. This is because the iso-elastic demand function
(1) implies that the industry output decreases with the demand elasticity for any ¯xed price
p > 1. To accommodate decreased industry output, the entry rate and industry size must fall.
Poisson Deaths As discussed earlier, a su±ciently high Poisson death rate is needed for the
existence of a stationary equilibrium in the present model. I now examine the impact of changes
in this rate, as detailed in the last panel of Table II. As expected, increased death rates lower
industry output. Surprisingly, ¯rms issue more debt and average industry leverage increases.
This is because an incumbent enjoys high output price and hence high tax bene¯ts of debt
(see equation (36)). Consider next the turnover rate. In order for the population of ¯rms to
keep being refreshed, the turnover rate of entry must rise in response to an increased Poisson
death rate. Surprisingly, the turnover rate of exit due to bankruptcy also rises, which is the
di®erence between the turnover rate of entry and the Poisson death rate.17 This is because the
exit threshold rises following an increase in the Poisson death rate. Thus, ¯rms are more likely
to go bankrupt and exit.
23V. Conclusion
In this paper, I present a competitive equilibrium model of industry dynamics and capital struc-
ture decisions. I show that technology (productivity) heterogeneity is important in determining
a ¯rm's survival probability and leverage ratio. In particular, in equilibrium there is a station-
ary distribution of surviving ¯rms. These ¯rms exhibit a wide variation of capital structures.
In addition, more e±cient ¯rms are less likely to exit and have lower agency costs. Finally, I
analyze comparative static properties of changes in technology growth, technology risk, entry
distribution, entry cost, ¯xed cost, bankruptcy cost, and tax policy.
The analysis reveals that the interaction between ¯nancing and production decisions is im-
portant in an industry equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium output price has an important
feedback e®ect. As a result, several conclusions reached in the standard single-¯rm contingent
claims models do not hold true in an equilibrium setting. Moreover, it moves predictions in the
right direction in terms of reconciling the empirical evidence. Speci¯cally, the analysis shows
that either one of the following exogenous factors can simultaneously explain the empirical ¯nd-
ings mentioned in the introduction: The slowdown of technology (productivity) growth, the
deterioration of entry distribution, or the increase in the corporate tax rate.
The paper also provides a number of new testable predictions regarding capital structure and
industry dynamics. First, industries with high technology growth or good starting distributions
of technology have relatively lower average leverage, lower turnover rates, and higher output.
Second, industries with risky technology have relatively lower average leverage, higher turnover
rates, and higher output. Third, industries with high bankruptcy costs have relatively lower
average leverage, lower turnover rates, and lower output. Fourth, industries with high ¯xed
operating costs have relatively lower average leverage, higher turnover rates, and lower output.
Finally, industries with high entry costs have relatively higher average leverage, lower turnover
rates, and lower output.
The paper could be extended in several directions, which are left for future research. First,
in the paper, the expected returns of equity and other macroeconomic variables are constant.
To study equity premium and other time-series behavior of the industry, it is necessary to intro-
duce aggregate uncertainty. Second, this paper considers only the con°ict of interest between
shareholders and bondholders. It would be interesting to study the con°ict of interest between
shareholders and managers. Third, I analyze ¯rms' initial capital structure decisions only, as in
most contingent claims models of capital structure in the literature. A model of dynamic capital
structure would be worth pursuing (Leland (1998), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Ju et al.
(2003), and Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2004)). Finally, it would be interesting to consider
¯nite maturity debt. This requires a constant default threshold in stationary equilibrium, which
can be delivered using the framework of Leland and Toft (1996) or Leland (1998).
24Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Propositions 1-2:18 I ¯rst prove Proposition 2. Proposition 1 is obtained by setting
b = 0: It follows from (27) that equity value given a default threshold y is given by
































where the last equality follows from the strong Markov property of the process (zt)t¸0 (see












where # is given in (24). Substitute this expression into above equations to derive















Use the smooth-pasting condition (28) to derive the optimal default threshold zd (b;p) in (30).
Use the fact that e(z;b;p) = e(z;b;pjzd) to derive equity value in (29). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: As in the proof of Propositions 1-2, one can use (13) and the























































Use the last expression and (A3) to obtain (32). Finally, one can derive ¯rm value in (33) using
equations (13), (29), and (32). Q.E.D.
25Proof of Proposition 4: Similar to the derivation of equation (33), one can deduce that
¯rm value given a default threshold y is given by















The ¯rst-best liquidation policy is to choose default threshold y so as to maximize ¯rm value
in (A6). It can be veri¯ed that the maximizer is zFB
d = zA: Equation (37) follows from the fact
that vFB (z;b;p) = v(z;b;pjzA): Finally, equation (38) follows from cA (z;b;p) = vFB (z;b;p) ¡
v (z;b;p): Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: As argued in Section III.A, the proof consists of three steps. In
the ¯rst step, one uses the entry condition to solve for the equilibrium output price p¤: Then
the exit threshold ze is determined by ze = zd (z;b;p¤) using equation (30). In the second step,
one solves for the density f of the stationary distribution ¹¤ up to a scale factor N¤: In the ¯nal
step, the entry rate N¤ is determined by the market-clearing condition (18). Speci¯cally, use
(5) and (16) to derive the industry output
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Notice that the integral
R 1
ze z°f(z)dz is improper since the density f has an in¯nite support.
Once f is derived towards the end of the proof, one will see that assumption (40) ensures that
this improper integral is ¯nite.
The remainder of the proof is devoted to the second step, which is key. It is convenient to
work in terms of the logarithm, x = logz. Then (xt)t¸0 is a Brownian motion satisfying:
dxt = ¹xdt + ¾xdWt; (A9)
where ¹x = ¹z ¡ 1
2¾2
z and ¾x = ¾z: Because the initial draw of z is uniform over [z;z]; the initial
draw of x = log(z) has an exponential distribution over [x;x]; where x = logz and x = logz:
This distribution has a density function
g(x) = exp(x ¡ b x); (A10)
where b x = log(z ¡ z):
Let the stationary distribution of incumbent ¯rms have a density function N¤Á(x) on [xe;1);
where xe = log(ze) and N¤ is the entry rate determined later: I will now use the Kolmogorov
equation to ¯nd the function Á(x) by considering three cases.
26I adapt the heuristic argument from Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 8). First, approximate
the Brownian motion by a random walk. To do so, divide time into short intervals of duration
dt; and the x space into short segments, each of length dh = ¾x
p
dt: Of the ¯rms located in one
such segment, during time dt a proportion ´dt will die. Of the rest, a fraction qr will move one






















Now consider the ¯rst case, where x · x < x: Then there are new entrants that realize shock
x since the support of their initial draw of shocks is [x;x]. There are N¤Á(x)dh ¯rms in the
segment centered at x. In the next unit of time period dt; all of these ¯rms move away with
either Poisson or Brownian shocks. New entrants, as well as ¯rms from the left and right, arrive
to take their places. For balance,
N¤Á(x)dh = N¤dtg(x)dh + qr(1 ¡ ´dt)N¤Á(x ¡ dh)dh (A12)
+ql(1 ¡ ´dt)N¤Á(x + dh)dh:




xÁ00(x) ¡ ¹xÁ0(x) ¡ ´Á(x) + g(x) = 0: (A13)
A particular solution to this equation can be derived as
Á0(x) = ex¡b x=(´ + ¹x ¡ ¾2
x=2): (A14)
To make economic sense, this density must be positive (also see Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.275)).
This is ensured by assumption (41) since ´ +¹x ¡¾2
x=2 = ´ +¹z ¡¾2
z > 0: The general solution
to (A13) is given by



















and A1 and A2 are constants to be determined.
In the second case, xe < x < x; there is no new entrant in the segment centered at x: Apply




xÁ00(x) ¡ ¹xÁ0(x) ¡ ´Á(x) = 0: (A17)
The general solution to this equation is given by
Á(x) = G1e¯1x + G2e¯2x; for xe < x < x; (A18)
27where G1 and G2 are constants to be determined.
In the third case, x ¸ x; there is no new entrant in the segment centered at x, so Á still
satis¯es the above ODE. Let the solution be
Á(x) = H1e¯1x + H2e¯2x; for x ¸ x; (A19)
where H1 and H2 are constants to be determined.




Á(x)dx < 1; (A20)





















Equation (A20) says that the total mass of incumbents must be ¯nite. Equation (A21) is derived
from the fact that when the process (xt) falls to xe; the ¯rm exits the industry. Finally, equations
(A22)-(A25) follow from Theorem 4.4.9 in Karatzas and Shreve (1991, p. 271). These equations
ensure su±cient smoothness of Á. Using equations (A20)-(A25), one can derive H2 = 0 and
G1;G2;A1;A2;H1 solve the following system of linear equations:
G1e¯1xe + G2e¯2xe = 0; (A26)
G1e¯1x + G2e¯2x = A1e¯1x + A2e¯2x + Á0(x);
G1¯1e¯1x + G2¯2e¯2x = A1¯1e¯1x + A2¯2e¯2x + Á0
0(x);
A1e¯1x + A2e¯2x + Á0(x) = H1e¯1x;
A1¯1e¯1x + A2¯2e¯2x + Á0
0(x) = H1¯1e¯1x:
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+ (¯2 ¡ 1)
¡
z1¡¯1 ¡ z1¡¯1¢
(¯2 ¡ ¯1)(z ¡ z)(´ + ¹z ¡ ¾2
z)
:






G1z¯1¡1 + G2z¯2¡1; for ze < z · z;
A1z¯1¡1 + A2z¯2¡1 + 1
(z¡z)(´+¹z¡¾2
z); for z < z · z;
H1z¯1¡1; for z > z:
(A28)
I ¯nally show that assumption (40) ensures
R 1
ze z°f(z)dz is ¯nite. It su±ces to show that
R 1














Thus, if and only if ¯1 + ° < 0 is satis¯ed, limz!1 z¯1+° = 0 and the above integral is ¯nite.
By (A16), the condition ¯1 + ° < 0 is equivalent to assumption (40). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: The analysis in Section II.D shows that when cf = 0; for any
output price p the optimal coupon rate b¤ (p) is given by (36). Since cf = 0; it follows from (31)




(# ¡ °)(r + ´)a(p)
¸1=°
: (A30)
Substituting (36) for b into this expression yields














Since this expression is independent of the output price, it is also the equilibrium exit threshold
zo
e given in (43). I now derive the equilibrium output price using the entry condition (42).
Substituting (33), (36), and (43) into (42), one can solve for the unique equilibrium output price
29po given in (44). Finally, the equilibrium entry rate No is obtained from (A8) by replacing p¤
with po and the scaled density fo is obtained from (A28) by replacing ze with zo
e: Q.E.D.
Appendix B. Computation of Stationary Equilibrium
This appendix provides explicit formulas and an algorithm to compute the stationary equi-
librium with endogenous leverage (bo;po;zo
e;No;¹o) described in Section III.B for the case with
positive ¯xed cost cf > 0. The algorithm consists of the following steps:
Step 1. Solve for the optimal coupon rate bo and the equilibrium output price po using the






























































Substituting the expressions for zA; zd; and A(z;p) in equations (25), (29), and (22) respectively
into the above two equations yields a system of two nonlinear equations for two unknowns, (b;p):
Any standard nonlinear equation solver can deliver numerical solutions for (bo;po).
Step 2. Solve for the exit threshold zo
e: Once (bo;po) is obtained, use (29) to compute
zo
e = zd (bo;po):
Step 3. Solve for the scaled density fo of the stationary distribution ¹o: The expression for
fo is the same as that given in (A28), but ze must be replaced by zo
e in the support and also in
the coe±cients A1;A2;G1;G2; and H1:
Step 4. Solve for the entry rate No: The expression for No is the same as that given in
(A8), but p¤ must be replaced by po:
The expressions for other important equilibrium variables are described as follows:
² Industry output. Use the industry demand (1) to derive
Y (¹o;bo;po) = (po)
¡" : (B3)
30² Turnover rate. It is de¯ned as the ratio of the entry rate to the mass of incumbents. Since

















² Average industry agency costs. The absolute value is de¯ned as the total industry agency
































² Average industry leverage. It is de¯ned as the ratio of the average industry debt value to
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36Table I. Base Case Parameter Values
Parameter Value
Returns to scale º 0:40
Depreciation rate ± 0:10
Shock drift ¹z 0:75%
Shock volatility ¾z 0:15
Riskless rate r 5:22%
Corporate tax rate ¿ 0:34
Bankruptcy cost 1 ¡ ® 0:20
Poisson death ´ 0:04
Entry cost ce 78:35
Entry distribution z 2:50
Entry distribution z 3:50
Price elasticity " 0:75
Fixed cost cf 0:00
37Table II. Comparative Statics for Selected Parameter Values. The parameter values
for the base case model are given in Table I. Comparative statics is based on the base case model.
When performing simulations for the entry cost and demand elasticity, I set the ¯xed cost cf = 5:
Industry Industry Average Turnover Exit Optimal Agency
Output Price Leverage % Rate % Threshold Coupon Cost %
Base case 1:00 1.00 23.09 7.51 1.91 6.66 2.57
¹z = 0:5% 0.97 1.04 28.12 7.73 1.89 6.70 3.37
¹z = 1:0% 1.03 0.96 17.50 7.29 1.92 6.62 1.80
¹z = 1:5% 1.10 0.88 4.46 6.91 1.94 6.55 0.39
¾z = 10% 0.97 1.04 39.43 6.04 2.04 6.28 2.76
¾z = 15% 1:00 1.00 23.09 7.51 1.91 6.66 2.57
¾z = 20% 1.06 0.92 7.04 9.13 1.79 7.18 1.08
z = 3:5 1:00 1.00 23.09 7.51 1.91 6.66 2.57
z = 4:0 1.06 0.92 22.42 7.46 2.03 6.49 2.42
z = 4:5 1.12 0.86 21.68 7.40 2.15 6.30 2.25
® = 95% 1.01 0.998 24.50 8.27 2.02 7.20 2.51
® = 90% 1.006 0.992 24.00 7.98 1.98 7.01 2.54
® = 80% 1:00 1.00 23.09 7.51 1.91 6.66 2.57
¿ = 25% 1.04 0.95 20.43 7.12 1.84 5.96 1.74
¿ = 34% 1:00 1.00 23.09 7.51 1.91 6.66 2.57
¿ = 40% 0.97 1.04 25.00 7.70 1.94 7.08 3.22
cf = 5 0.82 1.31 16.64 9.37 2.15 7.77 1.77
cf = 10 0.72 1.55 13.54 10.83 2.27 8.48 1.30
cf = 12 0.69 1.64 12.68 11.35 2.30 8.76 1.17
ce = 70 0.85 1.25 16.16 9.55 2.16 6.94 1.70
ce = 85 0.80 1.35 16.97 9.24 2.13 8.23 1.82
ce = 100 0.76 1.44 17.61 9.01 2.11 9.52 1.92
" = 0:60 0.85 1.31 16.64 9.37 2.15 7.66 1.77
" = 0:75 0.82 1.31 16.64 9.37 2.15 7.66 1.77
" = 0:90 0.79 1.31 16.64 9.37 2.15 7.66 1.77
´ = 0:03 1.07 0.91 10.04 6.16 1.89 5.99 1.12
´ = 0:04 1.00 1.00 23.09 7.51 1.91 6.66 2.57


























Figure 2: The determination of the equilibrium output price p¤. This ¯gure illustrates
that the equilibrium output price p¤ is determined by the entry condition { the expected ¯rm
value is equal to the entry cost.

























Figure 3: The e®ect of an increase in growth of technology on the scaled density of
¯rms. The solid line is for the base case model. The dashed line is for ¹z = 1:5%: All other
parameter values are given in Table I.





























Figure 4: The size distribution of ¯rms. This ¯gure plots the size distribution of ¯rms
measured according to output. This distribution is derived from the scaled density of the
equilibrium stationary distribution. The parameter values are given in Table I.
42Notes
1Early studies that relate the cross-sectional behavior of leverage to industry characteristics include Bradley,
Jarrell, and Kim (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988), among others.
2See Caves (1998) for a survey of the empirical literature on ¯rm turnover. See Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn
(1992), and Ericson and Pakes (1995) for important theoretical models of industry dynamics. All these papers
assume that ¯rms are all-equity ¯nanced.
3See Harris and Raviv (1991) for a survey of the theory of capital structure. They point out that \with regard
to further theoretical work, it appears that models relating to products and inputs are underexplored, while the
asymmetric information approach has reached the point of diminishing returns" (pp. 299-300).
4I do not consider con°icts between shareholders and managers. Morellec (2004) examines these con°icts in a
contingent claims framework.
5Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) present a three-period industry equilibrium model in which ¯rms can adopt
di®erent technologies. They do not study entry and exit decisions. See Williams (1995) for an extension in a
four-period model.
6I abstract from personal taxes in the paper.
7This assumption could be relaxed by allowing debt to be reorganized through, for example, debt exchange
o®ers as in Mella-Barral (1995) and Lambrecht (2001). This kind of analysis is, however, beyond the scope of this
paper.
8The entry (exit) rate is de¯ned as the number of ¯rms entering (going bankrupt and exiting) the industry
at each time. The same term used in some empirical studies (e.g. Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988))
corresponds to the turnover rate de¯ned later.
9The explicit expressions for the equilibrium are given in Appendix A.
10The same assumption is also made in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.275).
11For a wide range of reasonable parameter values, the Leland-style single-¯rm contingent claims model typically
predicts a much higher leverage ratio than that observed in practice. However, dynamic capital structure models
such as Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Ju et al. (2003), and Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2004) can predict
lower leverage ratios. A duopoly model in which ¯rms strategically set their leverage in the run-up to a war of
attrition may also generate a low leverage level for at least one of the two ¯rms.
12Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) attribute the variation of capital structures to the adoption of di®erent
technologies within the industry.
13Average industry ¯rm value is 395.57 in the present model. This number is not reported in Table II.
14Simulations (not reported in Table 2) con¯rm this positive correlation. The market-to-book ratio is a com-
monly used proxy for growth opportunities.
15As a robustness check, I redo all previous simulations for a number of positive values of the entry cost. I ¯nd
the results do not change qualitatively.
4316This result does not depend on the choice of cf = 5 since it is veri¯ed by simulations for many other values
of cf:
17This rate is given by 3.16, 3.51, and 3.80 for ´ equal to 0.03, 0.04, and 0.05, respectively.
18Here I use a probabilistic proof method similar to Mella-Barral (1995) and Morellec (2004). An alternative
standard method is to use ODEs (e.g., Leland (1994)).
44